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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20080706-CA

vs.
JESUS ARGUMEDO-ROORIGUEZ
Defendanty'Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

TURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Defendant appeals a conviction for disarming a police officer, a first degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.8 (West 2004), in the Third Judicial
District Court in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Dino Himonas
presiding. This Court has jurisdiction to consider the appeal under Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(j) (West 2004).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Issue 1: Is Defendant's brief inadequate for failure to develop and apply
relevant legal authority and failure to marshal the evidence?
Standard of Review: No standard of review applies.

Issue 2: Was the evidence sufficient to convict Defendant of disarming a
police officer?
Standard of Review: "When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of the
evidence, we must sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is against the clear
weight of the evidence, or if we otherwise reach a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made." State v. Gordon, 2004 UT 2, f 5, 84 P.3d 1167 (internal
quotations and citation omitted).
Issue 3: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in ruling that the testimony of
Defendant's expert was inadmissible?
Standard of Review: The trial court has "considerable discretion" in
determining whether expert testimony is admissible and whether a proposed expert
is qualified to give an opinion on specific matters. Craig Food Indus, v. Wehing, 746
P.2d 279, 282 (Utah 1987).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following statutes are relevant to this appeal and reproduced verbatim:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.8 (West 2004).
A person is guilty of a first degree felony who intentionally takes or
removes, or attempts to take or remove, a firearm from the person or
immediate presence of a person he knows is a peace officer:
(1) without the consent of the peace officer; and
(2) while the peace officer is acting within the scope of his authority as a
2

peace officer.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-306 (West 2004J.
Voluntary intoxication shall not be a defense to a criminal
charge unless such intoxication negates the existence of the mental
state which is an element of the offense; however, if recklessness or
criminal negligence establishes an element of an offense and the
actor is unaware of the risk because of voluntary intoxication, his
unawareness is immaterial in a prosecution for that offense.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
By information dated July 18, 2006, Defendant Jesus Argumedo Rodriguez
("Defendant") was charged with disarming a police officer, driving while under the
influence of alcohol, operating a vehicle by an alcohol-restricted person and failure
to yield the right of way. R. 1.
Following a two-day bench trial, Defendant was convicted on all counts. R.
211:169-77.
On July 11,2008, Defendant received a suspended five-years-to-life sentence
and was ordered to spend 180 days in the Salt Lake County jail. R. 195-97.
Defendant timely appealed. R. 204.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On July 17, 2006, Defendant was drunk. R. 211:169-70.
In fact, he was very drunk. According to West Valley City Police Officer
Garrett Freir, Defendant flunked all field sobriety tests administered after he was

3

stopped for erratic driving around 3:50 a.m. R. 210:21-33. Defendant had difficulty
maintaining his balance and nearly fell, first as he exited his vehicle and then later
during portions of the tests requiring him to walk or stand on one leg. R. 210:20,28,
32.
A later Breathalyzer test confirmed what was obvious to the officers:
Defendant was very drunk. His blood-alcohol concentration registered at 0.177—
more than double the legal limit for driving a car. See, e.g., R. 210:88.
These facts are undisputed. At the conclusion of his bench trial, Defendant
conceded he was guilty of DUI, operating a vehicle by an alcohol restricted driver
and failure to yield the right of way. R. 211:158-59.
The only remaining question was whether Defendant was also guilty of
attempting to disarm a police officer when he grabbed at Officer Freir's bolstered
sidearm as officers attempted to arrest him.
Defendant argues he simply fell. See, e.g., R. 211:166. Alternatively, be argues
that he was so intoxicated that he could not form the specific intent to disarm the
officer. Id.
However, the only witnesses who observed Defendant's movements
firsthand — the arresting officers — described them as conscious and deliberate. R.
210:38; 211:103. Both officers testified that they believed they were in imminent
danger.
4

"[Bjased on the [Defendant's] movements prior to and leading up to this
event, this was a very sudden movement, this was very specific, and it caused my
heart to drop, and I believe that he was making a movement towards my handgun,
as did my assisting officer. We both reacted/7 R. 210:83.
Officer Carl Wimmer confirmed Officer Freir's account:"Officer Freir told the
gentleman to turn around and put his hands behind his back. At that point the
subject, the Defendant, turned slightly to his left, and looked over his left shoulder
somewhat. That made me nervous. So I moved very close to the subject. I didn't
know if he was planning on running away or what the case may be. But it just
made me nervous. So I moved closer to the subject. At that point the Defendant
turned around quickly, moved in very quickly and close to Officer Freir, and
reached out and, from my perspective, grabbed Officer Freir's handgun/ 7

R.

211:102-03.
Officer Wimmer concluded: "I was extremely afraid for our safety/7 Id.
Officer Freir stated that he grabbed Defendant's arm and felt it stiffen as the
officer attempted to dislodge Defendant's hand from his gun. R. 210:38. To subdue
Defendant, Officer Wimmer kneed him in the chest and punched him. R. 211:10203.

Officer Wimmer then held Defendant in a headlock while Officer Freir

handcuffed him. R. 211; 105. The officers sat Defendant on the curb and summoned
paramedics. Id.
5

"Why did you do that?" Defendant asked. Id.
" [Because y]ou grabbed Officer Freir's gun. You grabbed his gun/' Officer
Wimmer replied. Id.
"I know/' Defendant responded, "but I was almost home, and you stopped
me." Id.
Defendant did not testify at trial and the officers' testimony is unrebutted.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I: Defendant's claims are inadequately briefed. Defendant cites
generic propositions from a few cases, but never properly develops or applies the
caselaw to his legal arguments. For this reason alone, this Cour should reject
Defendant's claims.
Point II: The evidence the Defendant attempted to seize Officer Freir's
handgun is not only adequate; it is overwhelming and unrebutted. Both Officers
Freil and Wimmer testified that Defendant did not simply stumble when he
lurched toward Officer Freil and placed his hand on the officer's handgun. And
when confronted, Defendant admitted that he grabbed the officer's gun.
Defendant offered no contrary evidence.
Point III: The trial court correctly excluded Defendant's proposed expert
testimony on intoxication. The expert, psychologist James L. Poulton, did not

6

establish a proper foundation for his opinion that Defendant was so intoxicated
that he could not form the mental state for the crime.
ARGUMENT
I.

DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS ARE INADEQUATELY BRIEFED.

A.

Lack of "meaningful legal analysis."

Defendant's brief lacks "meaningful legal analysis" because it presents
"bald citations to authority" with no development of or "reasoned analysis based
upon that authority." West Jordan City v. Goodman, 2006 UT 27, f 29,135 P.3d
874; State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, f 32, 973 P.2d 404. Accordingly, Defendant's
claims fail for inadequate briefing.
This Court "is not a depository in which the appealing party may d u m p
the burden of argument and research." Goodman, 2006 UT 27, ^f 29 (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). An adequately briefed argument must
provide "meaningful legal analysis." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). A brief must go beyond providing conclusory statements and "fully
identify, analyze, and cite its legal arguments." Id. (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted). Adequate briefing requires "not just bald citation to
authority but development of that authority and reasoned analysis based upon

7

that authority .. /'Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, f 31 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
Defendant's brief cites exactly 11 cases, none of which are developed or
meaningfully applied to the facts of this case. Indeed, virtually all of the cases
cited in Defendant's brief merely state general legal principles. See, e.g., App. Br.
at 26-27, 29. Most of Defendant's brief consists of long excerpts from the trial
transcript loosely knit together by unsupported argument and narrative. E.g.
App. Br. at 20-26; 30-39. Because Defendant has "dump[ed] the burden of
argument and research" on the Court, his claims should be rejected outright.
B.

Failure to marshal.

Part I of Defendant's brief is also inadequate because he raises a sufficiency
claim without marshalling the evidence. See App. Br. at 21-28. "A party
challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the
challenged finding." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). "Presenting evidence supporting
the challenged conclusion does not satisfy the marshaling requirement. Parties
cannot discharge their duty by simply providing] an exhaustive review of all
evidence presented at trial." United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower
Mountain Fonds, 2006 UT 35, % 26,140 P.3d 1200 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).

Rather, parties must "temporarily remove [their] own
8

prejudices arid fully embrace the adversary's position; [they] must play the
'devil's advocate.'"

Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

"[A]ppellants must present the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial
court and not attempt to construe the evidence in a light favorable to their" own
positions. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In sum, they
"must demonstrate how the court found the facts from the evidence and then
explain why those findings contradict the clear weight of the evidence."

Id.

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Rather than properly marshaling the evidence, Defendant simply ignores
the evidence that supports the trial court's findings and presents his own version
of the evidence, mostly in conclusory form. Defendant highlights portions of the
transcript supporting his extreme inebriation and difficulty maintaining his
balance. See, e.g., App. Br. at 20-26. He makes virtually no mention of the
officers' unequivocal testimony that Defendant's movements in attempting to grab
Officer Freir's weapon were directed, focused and intentional.
Defendant's failure to marshal the evidence renders his sufficiency argument
inadequate. See Phillips v. Hatfield, 904 P.2d 1108,1110 (Utah App. 1995). This Court
may affirm on that basis alone. See id. (declining to address appellant's arguments

9

and affirming where appellant's brief inadequate for failing to marshal the
evidence).
II. THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CONVICT
DEFENDANT OF DISARMING A POLICE OFFICER.
Even if this Court excuses Defendant's inadequate briefing, the evidence was
sufficient to convict him of disarming a police officer. Indeed, the only evidence
introduced at trial showed that Defendant, despite his apparent intoxication,
intentionally tried to grab Officer Freir's handgun.
When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of the evidence, this Court
"sustain[s] the trial court's judgment unless it is against the clear weight of the
evidence," or the Court "otherwise reachfes] a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made." State v. Gordon, 2004 UT 2, f 5, 84 P.3d 1167 (internal
quotations and citation omitted). Furthermore, "it is the province of the trier of
factfin this case the trial court] to determine which testimony and facts to believe
and what inferences to draw from those facts." State v. Cravens, 2000 UT App 344, f
15, 15 P.3d 635. This Court therefore "determine[s] only whether sufficient
competent evidence was admitted to satisfy each element of the charge." State v.
Honie, 2002 UT 4, If 44, 57 P.3d 977.
Voluntary intoxication is not a valid defense unless the intoxication "negates
the existence of the mental state which is an element of the offense;..." Utah Code

10

Ann. § 76-2-306 (West 2004); State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48 (Utah 1998) (voluntary
intoxication valid defense only when defendant's intoxication renders him incapable
of forming intent necessary for commission of crime). Voluntary intoxication does
not absolve a defendant of criminal responsibility for reckless criminal acts, State v.
Royhall, 710 P.2d 168,170 (Utah 1985), because such a defendant is responsible for
having voluntarily and knowingly become intoxicated. State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257
(Utah 1985).
However, voluntary intoxication may provide a defense to crimes if the
defendant is so intoxicated that he could not form the knowing or voluntary mental
state required for certain offenses. For example, a defendant may raise a voluntary
intoxication defense to crimes like aggravated murder where intoxication negates
the mental state requiring deliberation and premeditation. See, e.g., State v. Stenbeck,
2 P.2d 1050 (Utah 1931) ("It may be that due to intoxication or other causes the mind
is so deadened or so bereft of reason that it can neither deliberate nor premeditate
and yet the will power may be sufficiently active to form an intent to do an act
which results in the death of a human being/'); but see Claiborne v. State, 555 S.W.2d
414, 418 (Term. Crim. 1977) (although voluntary intoxication generally negates
premeditation or deliberation necessary for conviction of first-degree murder,
premeditation and deliberation are presumed when victim is police officer).

11

Evidence of a defendant's volitional conduct reasonably supports a
determination that he acted intentionally, despite intoxication. See, e.g., Roche v.
State, 690 N.E.2d 1115,1125 (Ind. 1998) ("[intoxication is not available as a defense
where the acts committed require a significant degree of physical or intellectual skill
such as devising a plan, operating equipment, instructing others, or carrying out
acts requiring physical skill"); State v. Humphrey, 845 P.2d 592, 605 (Kan. 1992) (if
defendant's intoxication "did not affect his ability to reason, to plan, to recall, or to
exercise his motor skills, he has not met the standard for the voluntary intoxication
defense/7).
In People v. Jones, 384 N.E.2d 523 (111. App. 1978), the defendant was convicted
of battery and resisting a peace officer after he punched and kicked an officer who
was wearing a uniform and also resisted two other officers at the police station and
in the cell block. Id. at 524-25. On appeal, the defendant argued that he was so
intoxicated that he was unable to cooperate with the police and could not control the
"involuntarily induced" movements of his arms and legs. Id. at 525. The appeals
court affirmed, holding that although defendant was intoxicated, jurors could have
reasonably concluded that the movements were calculated kicks and punches
directed at the officers. Id.
[T]o be a defense to criminal charges, a condition of intoxication must
be so extreme as to suspend all reason.. . .There are many degrees of
intoxication through which an individual may pass before reaching the
12

level of intoxication at which power of reason is entirely suspended so
as to render him incapable of any mental action, such as forming the
specific intent to commit a crime
Although defendant characterizes
his conduct as an "inability" to cooperate with the police, the evidence
indicates defendant's conduct could as well be characterized as an
unwillingness to cooperate.
Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, Defendant claims the evidence was insufficient to support his
conviction for attempting to disarm a police officer because he was too drunk to
form the mens rea to commit the crime. A person commits the offense of disarming a
police officer if he, as a party to the offense,
intentionally takes or removes, or attempts to take or remove, a firearm
from the person or immediate presence of a person he knows is a peace
officer:
(1) without the consent of the peace officer; and
(2) while the peace officer is acting within the scope of his
authority as a peace officer.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.8 (West 2004).
Defendant argues that he merely lost his balance and accidentally fell toward
Officer Freir — a movement the officers mistook for an attempt to grab the officer's
sidearm. See, e.g., App. Br. at 19. But there is no evidence to support this argument.
Officers Freir and Wimmer both testified that Defendant abruptly lunged forward,
placed his hand on Officer Freir7s bolstered handgun and attempted to pull the
weapon away from the officer. R. 210:83; 211:102-03.
13

Defendant offered no contrary evidence. Instead, Defendant offers contrary
interpretations of the evidence developed at trial. For example, Defendant points out
in his brief that his extreme inebriation caused him to lose his balance twice during
the field sobriety tests. App. Br. at 20-21. Because he was unsteady on his feet,
Defendant argues, it is possible that he lost his balance and fell toward Officer Freir.
See, e.g., App. Br. at 27.
This possibility was refuted by Defendant's own admission that he was
attempting to grab Officer Freir's gun:
" Why did you do that?" Defendant asked after the two officers subdued him.
R.211:105.
"[Because y]ou grabbed Officer Freir's gun. You grabbed his gun/ 7 Officer
Wimmer replied. Id.
"I know," Defendant responded, "but I was almost home, and you stopped
me." Id.
Although Officers Freir and Wimmer both acknowledged that Defendant was
very intoxicated and at times had difficulty maintaining his balance, they flatly
denied that defendant tripped, stumbled or lost his balance when he moved toward
Officer Freir. See, e.g., R. 210:83; 211:102-03. Because Defendant chose not to testify,
the only evidence concerning his actions comes from the arresting officers, both of
14

whom testified unequivocally that Defendant's movements were not inadvertent or
accidental.
At a more fundamental level, Defendant's argument suffers from a glaring
inconsistency. On the one hand, Defendant relies on the officers' testimony—and
their credibility—to attempt to establish that he was so intoxicated that he lost his
balance and nearly fell on at least two occasions during the sobriety tests. See, e.g.
App. Br. at 20-25. By contrast, when the officers testifies that Defendant attempted
to grab Officer Freir's handgun, their testimony is dismissed unreliable. See, id., at
13, 26. This argument makes no sense.

If the officers were able to accurately

observe and report Defendant's voluntary attempts to follow instructions given as
part of the field sobriety tests, as well as his involuntary loss of balance, there is no
reason to discount their later determination that Defendant was acting voluntarily
when he attempted to disarm Officer Freir.
In sum, the evidence supporting Defendant's conviction for attempting to
disarm a peace officer was not merely sufficient; it was undisputed.

15

III.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
RULING THAT THE DR. POULTON'S TESTIMONY
CONCERNING DEFENDANT'S MENTAL STATE WAS
INADMISSIBLE BECAUSE IT LACKED AN ADEQUATE
FOUNDATION.

The trial court was well within its discretion when it ruled that Defendant's
expert had not provided proper foundation for his opinion that Defendant was too
intoxicated to form the intent to disarm a police officer.
The trial court has "considerable discretion" in determining whether expert
testimony is admissible and whether a proposed expert is qualified to give an
opinion on specific matters. Craig Food Indus, v. Wehing, 746 P.2d 279, 282 (Utah
1987). To determine the admissibility of expert testimony, a trial court looks to rule
702, Utah Rules of Evidence:
. . . [I]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise.
Utah R. Evid. 702(a).1 Before expert testimony based on scientific evidence may be
admitted, the proponent of the evidence must satisfy a three-prong test developed

1

On November 1,2007, rule 702 was amended, adding subsections (b) and (c).
The amendment itself appears to do no more than codify the threshold requirement
of inherent reliability under step one of Rimmasch, as well as codify the alternative
ways by which the requirement may be satisfied, i.e., through an evidentiary
hearing or by judicial notice. See Utah R. Evid. 702. However, the advisory
16

in State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989). The proponent of the testimony must
demonstrate that: (1) "the scientific principles and techniques underlying the
expert's testimony are inherently reliable/' (2) "the scientific principles or
techniques at issue have been properly applied to the facts of the particular case by
sufficiently qualified experts," and (3) the evidence is otherwise admissible under
"rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence." State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 641 (Utah
1996). The burden of persuasion rests on the proponent of the evidence. See
Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 396,407.
The Utah Supreme Court has explained that this standard for admitting
expert testimony "is necessary because science in the court is a two-edged sword.
While often helpful, scientific testimony also has the potential to overawe and
confuse, and even to be misused for that purpose." Alder v. Bayer Corp., 2002 UT
115, ^ 56,61 P.3d 1068. Further, the supreme court's "jurisprudential history reveals

committee note mirrors the federal note regarding expert testimony on general
principles:
It might be important in some cases for an expert to educate the
factfinder about general principles, without attempting to apply these
principles to the specific facts of the case. The rule recognizes that an
expert on the stand may give a dissertation or exposition of principles
relevant to the case, leaving the trier of fact to apply them to the facts.
Utah R. Evid. 702, Advisory Committee Note.

17

a consistent attempt to ensure the reliability and helpfulness of evidence while
allowing a maximum of relevant information to flow to the finder of fact/' Id.
Because voluntary intoxication provides a defense only when the level of
intoxication negates the mental state for the crime, see section II, above, Dr.
Poulton's testimony was potentially relevant to only a single issue: Did defendant
have the ability to form the intent to disarm Officer Freil?
In an effort to provide sufficient foundation for his opinion, Dr, Poulton
stated he is a consultant for Odyssey House, a treatment center for all kinds of
addictions, R. 211:142, and that he, like other psychologists, "continually get training
on physiological effects of things like alcohol and other substances." R. 211:156. He
acknowledged, however, that treating alcoholics "is not a huge part of my practice,
no." R. 211:142.
He testified that he based his opinion on interviews with Defendant, his wife,
his business associate and a friend.

R, 211:144-45. He also administered a

personality test and reviewed the police reports concerning the arrest, R. 211:151,
and reviewed the police reports prepared by Officers Freil and Wimnier. Dr.
Poulton noted that, according to police reports, Defendant fell when he exited his
vehicle, which indicated that he "was so intoxicated that he was unable actually to
get his body to follow through with any intent... I think that, given that he was
unable to make his body move in a gross motor movement like that, he was also just
18

a couple of minutes later unable to make his body move with the intent of wresting
the gun away from the officer. " R. 211:154-55.
Ultimately, the trial court ruled that Dr. Poulton's testimony was
inadmissible. R. 211:157-58. Under Rimmasch, this ruling is clearly correct.
Defendant fails under the first Rimmasch prong because he did not show that "the
scientific principles and techniques underlying the expert's testimony are inherently
reliable." Crosby, 927 P.2d at 641. Indeed, it is difficult to see how the "principles
and techniques" Dr. Poulton discussed in his testimony are properly deemed
"scientific." The only aspect of Dr. Poulton's testimony premised on even remotely
scientific principles or techniques concerned his use of the MMPI (Minnesota
Multiphasic Personality Inventory), a widely used diagnostic test. But Dr. Poulton
never discloses the results of Defendant's MMPI or explains how the test is relevant
to the question of whether Defendant's voluntary intoxication negated his ability to
form the requisite mental state to try to disarm Officer Freir.
Under step two of the Rimmasch test, the proponent of the expert testimony
must establish "an adequate foundation for the proposed testimony." Rimmasch,
775 P.2d at 398 n.7; Crosby, 927 P.2d at 641. This step requires showing that "the
scientific principles or techniques have been properly applied to the facts of the
particular case by qualified persons and that the testimony is founded on that
work." Id.
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Again, given that Dr. Poulton provided virtually no testimony concerning the
"science" he employed to reach his conclusions, it is impossible to know whether
the scientific principles or techniques, if any, were properly applied. And because
the science underlying Dr. Poulton's opinion was never articulated, it is equally
impossible to know whether he had the necessary qualifications to properly apply
the scientific principles or techniques. Certainly, Dr. Poulton was qualified to testify
on accepted treatments for alcoholism, as well as Defendant's history, psychological
profile, possible psychiatric diagnoses and his propensity for violence. R. 211:142,
147,148-53. But such testimony was not relevant to the narrow issue of Defendant's
mental state on the night of his arrest. As the trial court found, Dr. Poulton "has not
been qualified to render the opinion you have asked for ..." R. 211:158.
Finally, Dr. Poulton failed address or attempt to explain what was arguably
the most critical item of evidence against Defendant—his verbal acknowledgment
that he was attempting to grab Officer Freil's weapon. R. 211:105.
In sum, Dr. Poulton failed to provide sufficient foundation to support opinion
testimony on the one narrow issue relevant to Defendant's guilt or innocence —
whether he could form the requisite intent to disarm or attempt to disarm a police
officer at the time of the crime. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling
the testimony inadmissible.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm Defendant's conviction.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 17* day of June, 2009.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General
BRETTJ.DELPORTO
Assistant Attorney General
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